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Issues and Findings
Discussed in this Brief: An evaluation of the impact of two D.C.
Superior Court experimental interventions on drug-involved defendants in
Washington. During the experiment,
all drug felony defendants were
randomly assigned to one of three
dockets established to expedite the
handling of drug cases. One drugcase docket intervened in the
standard manner. Another docket
intervened through a new comprehensive treatment program. The
third offered an experimental program mandating a graduated schedule of sanctions if the defendant
failed compulsory drug tests.
Key issues: Researchers measured
the impact of the programs on defendants' drug use, criminal activity,
and social and economic functioning
using court records and self-report
data from a survey of defendants.

The study also examined program
costs and estimated the value of
benefits in the form of averted costs
of victimization, arrest, prosecution,
and incarceration.
Key findings: Among the impact
evaluation findings are the following:

• Sanctions program participants
were significantly less likely than the
standard docket sample to be arrested
in the year following sentencing.
• Assignment to dockets offering
the experimental programs significantly reduced defendants' drug use
Jretrial release. The reducdrug use were even greater
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Evaluation of the D.C. Superior
Court Drug lnteiVention Programs
By Adele Harrell, Shannon Cavanagh, and John Roman

In 1993, the Washington, D.C., Superior
Court embarked on an ambitious experiment to test court-based interventions for
drug-involved defendants. 1 During the
experiment, all drug felony defendants were
randomly assigned to one of three dockets
the court had established in 1992 to expedite the handling of drug cases. Each
docket offered different services as follows:
• The standard docket continued to handle
drug cases in a routine manner (which
included twice-weekly drug tests and
judicial monitoring), while the other
two offered new intervention services
in addition to drug testing and judicial
monitoring.
• The treatment docket intervened with
a comprehensive treatment program
designed to provide drug-involved individuals with the skills, self-esteem,
and community resources necessary to
help them leave the criminal life.
• The sanctions docket penalized
participants for failing drug tests and
encouraged them to enter treatment,
if needed. Failure to appear and test
drug-free twice each week resulted in
the swift and certain application of
clearly defined penalties. Under this
sanctions approach, defendants received case management and were

referred to community-based treatment,
if needed or desired.
The Center for Substance Abuse Treatment and the National Institute of Justice
funded an evaluation to examine the programs' impact on eligible defendantsthe target group-and those who agreed
to participate in the two intervention services. Key components common to all
three dockets were early intervention, frequent drug testing, judicial monitoring of
each defendant's progress, and a computerized system that provided judges immediate access to defendants' drug test
results.
The study found reductions in drug use
during pretrial release for defendants in
both experimental dockets, reductions in
arrests during the year after sentencing
for sanctions program participants, and
reductions in drug-related social problems for treatment program participants.

Supporting research
Specialized drug dockets, often in the
form of drug courts, have emerged in a
number of jurisdictions, supported by
research indicating that:
• Drug use is directly linked to
crime. Drug-using offenders are
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when program participants were
compared to the standard docket
sample.
• Sanctions program participants
who attended Narcotics Anonymous/Alcoholics Anonymous during
the program period had a significantly lower likelihood of heroin
and/or cocaine use in the year after
sentencing.
• Treatment program participants
reported significantly fewer drugrelated social problems than standard docket participants in the year
after sentencing. However, sanction
docket defendants did not report
similar reductions in drug-related
social problems.
• Sanction program participants said
agreeing in advance to the sanctions
and the rules for applying penalties
gave them a feeling of control.
• The twice-weekly drug tests
proved to be a relatively inexpensive
strategy for screening defendants for
drug use in a timely manner. Using
tests as a screening process enabled
the intervention programs to devote
their staff resources to known users.
• The significant reductions in arrests among sanctions program
participants resulted in a total net
benefit of $713,570, savings of
about $2 for every $1 in program
costs.

Target audience: Federal, State, and
local court administrators and judges;
State and local government administrators; State and local police agencies; drug treatment programs; and
researchers.
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involved in hig
ity; the frequency and seventy ot their
criminal behavior grows as their drug
use increases. 2 Drug addicts commit as
much as four to six times more crimes
while using drugs than whe n they are
not abusing narcotics, a pattern that is
even more pronounced among habitual
offenders.:l, 4
• Higher rates of arrests, stricter
laws, and 1nore aggressive sentencing policies do not deter many drug
users exposed to these penalties.
This leads to a revolving door scenmio in
which <hug-involved offender,; appear
repeatedly before the courts. One study
found 60 percent of opiate-dependent
Federal parolees were reincarcerated
within 6 months of release--vi1tually
all for narcotics-related <Times-at an
incarceration cost of more than $27,000
per person, per year."
• Contt·ary to popular opinion, drug
treatment is effective-not for everyone and not all the time, but, on average,
it works. The Drug Abuse Treatment
Outcome Study (DATOS) showed that
the percentage of regular cocaine users
dropped from 66 percent in the year befin·e treatment to 22 percent in the year
after treatment among those receiving
long-term residential treatment, while
the percentage reporting predatmy illegal
activity dmpped from 41 percent to
16 percent. The National Treatment
Improvement Evaluation Study f(mnd
40 percent to 50 pereent of regular cocaine and heroin users who spent at
least 3 months in treatment were almost
<hug-free in the year after treatment,
regardless of the treatment type. This
5-year study of more than 4,000 drug
treatment clients found large and significant decreases in their alcohol and drug
use, criminal activity, AIDS risk , and

me, and physical and
mental neann 1 year after discharge. At
least three major studies indicate that
clients who stayed in drug treatment for
3 months or longer reported greater reductions in <hug use than those who
received less treatment, regardless of
treatment type.r'
• Criminal justice intervention with
drug-involved offenders can increase participation in tt·eatment
and reduce crime. Studies from
the California Civil Addi c t Program,
community-based methadone maintenance programs, therape uti c communities, and drug court outpatient
programs found lower crime rates
among offenclers who received drug
treatment. 7 An American University
survey of the 200 oldest drug courts
found that 70 percent of those offenders
who entered the programs remained
active in treatment at the e nd of I
year.B In Dade County, Florida, drug
court defendants were less likely to
recidivate and had longer periods to
rearrest than other felony drug defendants.9 Treatment combined with urinalysis and court monitoring with
sanctions is more likely to be
successful than treatment alone.w
• Criminal justice intervention is a
good investment of publie funds.
The Honolulu Drug Court in Hawaii
estimated it saved between $677,000
and $854,000 per year in averted prison
costs for offenders who would have
been incarcerated if not successfully
treated. 11 The Multnomah County Drug
Court in Oregon saved nearly $2.5 million per year in criminal justice costs.
When savings in victimization, theft reduction, public assistance, ancl medical
costs were added, the payoff rose to a
little more than $10 million per year. 12
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Identifying defendants for
drug interventions

h
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Drug testing was the primary means
used to identify drug-using defendants.
The process is illustrated in exhibit l.
Detained anestees were routinely
tested for drugs by the Pretrial Services
Agency (PSA), usually within 24 hours
of anest. Positive drug tests or reports
of cunent drug use on a PSA intake
interview resulted in mandatory twiceweekly drug testing as a condition of
release. PSA staff regularly reviewed
defendants' test results prior to each
hearing and flagged the files of those
defendants who tested positive for
drugs at arrest and failed two subsequent drug tests as eligible for intervention. Drug test failures included
positive tests, missed tests, and submission of tampered urine samples. 14
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Exhibit 1. Case identification for Superior Court Drug Intervention Program (SCDIP)

Defendants arrested on felony drug
charges were randomly assigned to one
of the three drug dockets prior to their
first court appearance. Docket assignment was made prior to determining
defendants' program eligibility.
On each of the three dockets, defendants were offered a plea at an early
hearing. Pleas were not negotiated after
the first offer. If the defendant accepted
the offer, he or she remained on the
docket, and the same judge handled the
case throughout pretrial and sentencing. If the defendant refused to accept
the plea offer, he or she was assigned to
a separate trial docket. Status hearings
occuned about once a month, and defendants could be identified as eligible
at any one of these hearings. 13 Case
processing proceeded as usual and if
and when a defendant on one of the
two experimental intervention dockets
(treatment or sanctions) exhibited
drug problems, the intervention was
offered.

Br

Arrest on a Drug Felony Charge

~
Initial Drug Test at Jail

(24-72 hours after arrest)

~
Random Assignment*

(to 1 of 3 SCDIP dockets)

~
First Appearance:
Sets Conditions of Release:

(large majority released on own recognizance)

~

/
If initial post-pretrial release drug test
positive, 2x per week drug test r~qu1 red

If released and initial drug test
negative, no subsequent testing required

1

~

~

Regular hearings** on assigned
SCDIP docket

Regular hearings** on assigned
SCDIP docket

Eligible for SCDIP as soon as 2 post-release
drug tests are skipped or positive
(about 40% on each docket)

Eligible for SCDIP if judge finds evidence
of drug use during hearings

*Defendants were not allowed to transfer to another SCDIP docket.
**Plea offers were made at regular docket hearings and could occur before, after, or at the same time a
defendant became eligible for SCDIP, and the program offer was not contingent upon acceptance of the
plea. However, if the plea was rejected, defendants transferred out of the SCDIP dockets to a trial docket.

Drug testing took place at PSA's
highly automated laboratory in the
court house. The laboratory used
EMIT urinalysis to test for a full
screen of drugs-cocaine, marijuana,
PCP, and heroin. 15 The state-of-the-art
technology included picture identification of defendants, supervised submission of samples with a guaranteed
chain of custody, and quality control
procedures managed by an onsite
laboratory supervisor. Test results
were automatically entered into a
sophisticated computer program that
had information on the defendant and
the case. Judges received test results

within 30 minutes via computers at the
bench in each courtroom. Judges on
all three dockets frequently referred to
their computers during hearings. Disputed results were confirmed by gas
chromatography.
Defendants were dropped from the
program if their case was dismissed
or they transfened to a trial docket less
than 30 days after becoming eligible
(the percentage of cases going to trial
was less than 5 percent and did not
differ significantly by docket). A few
defendants in the treatment program
continued in treatment while they
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appeared on the trial docket but were
not included in the evaluation sample.
Exhibit 2 compares the intervention
services and case handling practices
of the three dockets during the demonstration program.
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The standard docket
Standard case processing for drug felony
defendants in D.C. Superior Court included twice-weekly drug testing and judicial monitoring of the results. Current
computerized drug test information was

f
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available at the judge's bench at each
hearing. The standard docket judges
typically encouraged defendants who
tested positive or missed tests to seek
treatment but did not provide case management staff to assist them and did not
levy sanctions for test failures. Cases of

Exhibit 2. Comparison of the three Superior Court Drug Intervention Programs (SCDIP)
Sanctions Program
(240 participants,
125 nonparticipants)
Intervention
Content

•

•
•
•

Treatment Program
(140 participants,
206 nonparticipants)

Drug tests-2x per week
Judicial monitoring
Court-imposed penalties for
bad drug tests
Case manager assisted entry into
community-based treatment as
needed

•
•

•
•
•

Intervention
Delivery to
Participants

•

•
•

•
•
•

•

Average number of days
to program entry
Accepted program offer
Average number of days
in program
Average number of
sanction hearings
Number of all
hearings average
Median number of days
to case disposition
Total number of sanctions
imposed
3 days in jury box
3 days in jail
5-7 days in detox
7 days in jail

•

Percentage who dropped
out of drug testing
• Self-reported drug or
alcohol treatment during
pretrial period
Residential treatment
(referred by program)
Detox

NNAA
Outpatient
Methadone
Partial/day program
Other

64
66%
132
4.7

12.5
251
437
182
121
82
52
38%

82%
13%
63%
60%
26%
17%
17%
31%

•
•
•
•

•

•
•

Standard Docket

Drug tests-3-5x per week
Judicial monitoring
Daily intensive outpatient drug
treatment in court-based program
Court penalties or termination from
the program for repeated violation
of treatment program rules
Progression and graduation
ceremonies for success
Average number of days
to program entry
92
Accepted program offer
40%
Average number of days
in program
188
Total number of progression,
compliance, and graduation
ceremonies
9.5
Number of all
hearings average
15.6
Median number of days
to case disposition
394
Percentage of scheduled
treatment days attended
36%

•

Percentage who dropped
out of drug testing
• Self-reported drug or
alcohol treatment during
pretrial period
Residential treatment
(referred by program)
Detox

NNAA
Outpatient
Methadone
Partial/day program
Other

•
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•

•
•

•
•

Drug tests-2x per week
Judicial monitoring
Voluntary participation in communitybased treatment encouraged

Number of all
hearings average
Median number of days
to case disposition

•

50%

97%
8%
48%
73%
36%
3%
30%
52%

Percentage who dropped
out of drug testing
• Self-reported drug or
alcohol treatment during
pretrial period
Residential treatment
(referred by program)
Detox

NNAA
Outpatient
Methadone
Partial/day program
Other

6.8
223

41%

74%
6%
33%
63%
26%
7%
12%
25%
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Evaluation of drug courts
!though the D.C. Superior Court
Drug Intervention Programs were not considered a drug court, they shared many key
elements with drug courts, such as frequent
urinalysis and judicial supervision. The court
now runs a conventional drug court that
combines the treatment and sanctions
programs into a single program. To better
understand drug courts in both policy and
practice, the National institute of Justice and
the Drug Court Program Office have funded
research into how they function and their
effects upon defendant populations.
In 1997 and 1998, NIJ and DCPO jointly
funded the first evaluations of four older
drug court programs in Portland, Oregon;
Las Vegas, Nevada; Pensacola, Florida; and
Kansas City, Missouri. These sites were selected for two-phase evaluations. The first
phase included a process evaluation of these
programs, as well as an examination of

those defendants (who would have been
eligible for inte1vention on the basis of
two failed drug tests after pretrial release) reached disposition in about
7.5 months (233 days) and averaged
6.8 hearings. Many of these defendants
voluntarily participated in communitybased treatment programs during pretrial
release, primarily Narcotics Anonymous/
Alcoholics Anonymous (NA/AA) meetings. One-third repmted attending
detoxification services, and one-quarter
reported receiving outpatient treatment.
Nearly two-thirds (65 percent) were
sentenced to probation, including 88
percent of those who tested dmg free
in the month before sentencing and 63
percent o[ those who tested positive or
skipped drug tests in the month before
sentencing.

criminal recidivism of drug court participants.
A report of the results of this research will
be published in late 2000. The second
phase of these grants is presently under way
and is examining participant retention in
treatment, changes in drug court participants' lifestyles, and cost benefits of these
programs. Results for these second-phase
programs will be available in 2001.
Later in 1998, in response to another solicitation, NIJ and DCPO funded a grant to
examine 14 drug courts funded by DCPO
in 1995 and 1996 under the Crime Act of
1994. This grant was designed for two
phases of research. The first phase was to
develop a framework for describing the
structural components of drug court programs and should be completed late in
2000. The second phase will evaluate
program impacts of these courts.

The graduated sanctions
program
Defendants eligible for the graduated
sanctions program were offered a greatly
increased chance of receiving probation
rather than incarceration at sentencing
for successful program completion.
Two-thirds of the eligible defendants accepted the offer. Based on data from the
postsentem:ing focus group, def(~ndants'
decisions to join the sanctions program
appeared to be motivated by their desire
to avoid incarceration. Despite concerns
about the risks of sanctions, most eligihle
defendants ami their defense attorneys
were attracted by the increased likelihood
the defendant would be placed on probation instead of being sentenced to
incarceration.

••
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Defendants entered the program about
2 months (64 days) after arrest. At
program acceptance, participants
signed contracts agreeing to submit
to twice-weekly urinalysis tests and
report to court for sanctioning if they
tested positive, submitted a tampered
sample, or skipped a test. Sanctions
included 3 days in the jury box for the
first infraction, 3 days in jail for the
second infraction, 7 days in detoxification for the third infraction, and 7 days
in jail for subsequent infractions.
The graduated sanctions program emphasized the swiftness and certainty of
the sanction imposed.
• Swiftness. Each defendant was
tested for a full screen of illegal
drugs-cocaine, marijuana, PCP,
and heroin. Participants were instructed to call a pretrial service
officer the evening of their drug test
to learn the results. If a participant
tested positive, he or she was instructed to come before the judge
the following day for a compliance
hearing. If a participant failed to
appear for the hearing, a bench
warrant for arrest was i~;sued.
• Certainty. Ninety-seven percent
of the positive drug tests resulted in
a scheduled compliance hearing.
Excuses were accepted at 16 percent of the hearings. The judges adhered to the sanction plan moc;t of
the time, although a few defendants
rec!~ived the first sanction of 3 clays
in the jury box more than once,
and some defendants were sent to
detoxification before tht-' third sanction, generally at their own request.
In Ihe f()(:us t,'Toup, program pmticipants
said they agreed in advance lo the sanctions and the rules lin· applying penalties
because they felt it gave them control.

••
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These defendants knew they could avoid
penalties by not using drugs, and it was
their responsibility to show the judge
they were clean through drug test results.
Because the sanctioning rules were
simple and clearly explained in advance,
defendants viewed the penalties they
received as fair.
Participants were significantly more likely
than standard docket eligibles to receive
detoxification during the program but
otherwise resembled the standard docket
eligibles in their use of communitybased treatment. Sixty percent of the
participants reported attending NA/AA
during the program, as did 63 percent of
those on the standard docket.
Graduated sanctions program participation averaged about 4.5 months (132
days) and required an average of 4. 7
sanction hearings per participant, imposing a total of 437 sanctions. Participants'
cases remained open about 28 days
longer than cases of eligible defendants
on the standard docket (based on the median number of days to case disposition).
Although the overall rate of defendants
receiving probation was 65 percent on
the sanctions and standard dockets,
those who tested clean in the month before sentencing increased their chances
of probation. Of those who were clean,
95 percent of both groups received probation (some had prior criminal histories
that precluded probation) compared
to 56 percent who never participated,
dropped out of testing, or tested positive
for drugs during the month before
sentencing.

The treatment program
Eligible defendants on the treatment
docket were offered an intensive day
treatment program and were told successful completion would greatly increase the likelihood they would be
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placed on probation rather than incarcerated at sentencing. Those who
accepted this offer entered treatment
about 3 months (92 days) after arrest.
Less than half (40 percent) of the eligible defendants agreed to join the program. The defendants' reluctance to join
the program stemmed from its requirement that they attend treatment 3 to 5
days each week. For some, this conflicted with work and child care responsibilities. Others wanted less intensive
treatment.
One lesson from the high rate of
nonparticipation is that multiple treatment options are needed because druginvolved defendants vary widely in the
severity of their drug abuse. The court
subsequently broadened the treatment
options for drug-involved offenders,
placing a large percentage of them in
a highly focused day reporting program
of several hours each week and reserving
more intensive treatment for those who
were more severely addicted to drugs.
The treatment program was based on 10
treatment modules that included group
education, group and individual counseling, drug testing, and acupuncture.
Clients moved through sequential treatment stages, which consisted of an
orientation phase and a five-level intensive treatment phase toward graduation. Progression through the program
was contingent upon the participants'
progress toward the objectives outlined
in the treatment plan. For the first year,
the program met 5 days per week from
9 a.m. to 3 p.m. Subsequently, it shifted
to shorter hours and 3 days per week.
Defendants' movement from one level
to the next was designed as a reward for
positive behavior and to acknowledge
the completion of 21 days of treatment.
The treatment team reviewed the defendants' progress and made recommenda-

•• • ••
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tions for movement to the next level to
the judge. The treatment staff imposed
penalties for nonattendance, tardiness,
and behavior problems in treatment but
not for positive drug tests, which were
handled by judges. Judicial admonishment and program termination were
used to respond to persistent, serious
problems. Progression to the next level
was celebrated in a court ceremony
during which the judge congratulated
defendants for their success and presented small gifts to recognize their
achievement of treatment goals. Treatment graduates were honored with
certificates presented by the judge in
courtroom ceremonies attended by
friends, family members, fellow program participants, and staff from the
court and treatment program.
Treatment participation averaged about
6.3 months (188 days). The program
participants averaged 9.5 more hearings
(progression and compliance hearings)
than eligible defendants on the standard
docket. Participants' cases remained
open 171 days longer than defendants'
cases on the standard docket due to the
duration of the treatment program and a
longer period before program entry.
Overall, 19 percent of the 140 participants graduated from the treatment program, and 9 percent left the program
doing well (there were an additional
206 nonparticipants in the docket).
The remainder were terminated as
unsuccessful, absconded, or, in some
cases, were transferred to other treatment programs. As was the case with the
standard docket eligibles, about twothirds of the participants, regardless of
completion status, received probation.
The treatment program suffered substantial operational problems and was repeatedly forced to close due to flooding,
heating problems, and poor ventilation.
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District financial problems meant service components such as health screening, literacy training, and other support
services could not be purchased. Participants attended a little more than onethird of the scheduled treatment days.
Thus, the impact analysis does not test
the effect of treatment under optimal
conditions. A significant lesson for
courts planning drug treatment linkages
is that procedures for monitoring treatment quality need to be established.

The impact evaluation

in

prior to June 30, 1997. 16 They included
346 eligible defendants on the treatment
docket (140 treatment participants),
365 eligible defendants on the graduated
sanctions docket (240 program participants), and 311 eligible defendants on
the standard docket. The sample groups
were mostly black (96 percent) and
male (85 to 89 percent). The median age
ranged from 30 to 33 years old. More
than two-thirds tested positive for a
stronger drug (cocaine, heroin, or both)
in the first 60 days of drug testing.

Organization 1 year after sentencing.
The survey and records data were
combined with court and program
records on services delivered; results
of focus group interviews with defendants; and process evaluation findings
based on observations, interviews with
program staff and judges, and review
of policies, procedures, and reports.
A summary of impact evaluation findings is shown in exhibit 4. Results of
the impact evaluation of reductions
in criminal activity were used to estimate the benefits and returns to the
programs in averted costs of crime.

Data on defendant outcomes included:

The graduated sanctions program and
the treatment program were each independently compared to the standard
docket that offered only drug testing
and judicial monitoring. The evaluation examined the impact of the programs on eligible defendants-the
target group of defendants-and on
the subset of eligible defendants who
agreed to participate in the two programs, as shown in exhibit 3.
The evaluation samples consisted of all
eligible defendants randomly assigned to
the dockets between September 1, 1994,
and January 31, 1996, and sentenced

I
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• Drug use. Results of twice-weekly
drug tests administered during pretrial release and self-report data.

Reductions in drug use
Both experimental programs significantly
reduced defendants' drug use during
pretrial release as compared to the standard docket. Program participants and
nonparticipants on both the sanctions and
treatment dockets were significantly more
likely to test drug free in the month before
sentencing, and a larger proportion of
their tests were negative compared to the
standard docket sample. The reductions
in drug use were even more significant
when only program participants were

• Criminal activity. Records from
the D.C. police and the FBI on
arrests and self-report data.
• Other outcomes. Social and economic outcomes and postprogram
use of services provided by selfreport data.

The self-report data were collected
from a personal survey with 482
defendants conducted by the Gallup

Exhibit 3. Eligibility for SCDIP evaluation sample
Treatment Docket

Sanctions Docket

I

Drug Users=451
Not Eligible for
Sample
• Case Dismissed
n=43 (10%)
• Case Open at
Study End
n=62 (14%)

Eligible for Program•
and Sample
n=346 (77%)

Not Eligible for
Sample
• Case Dismissed
n=47 (10%)
• Case Open at
Study End
n=56 (12%)

Drug Users=468

Eligible for Program
and Sample
n=365 (78%)

/
Treatment
Participants
n=140

Nonparticipants
n=206

Standard Docket

Sanctions
Participants
n=240

~
Nonparticipants
n=125

*Court and arrest records were available for all sample members. Survey data available for sample subset.

~
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Drug Users=395

1
Not Eligible for
Sample
• Case Dismissed
n=48 (12%)
• Case Open at
Study End
n=36 (9%)

Eligible for Sample
n=311 (79%)

•••
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Exhibit 4. Findings on the impact of the SCDIP graduated sanctions and treatment programsa
Sanctions
Program
Eligible
Defendants
(n=346)

Sanctions
Program
Participants
(n=240)

Treatment
Program
Eligible
Defendants
(n=346)

Treatment
Program
Participants
(n=140)

Impact During the Program Period

I

Reduced Drug Use
• Tested Drug Free in Month Before Sentencingb
• Percentage of Tests Dirty in Month Before Sentencing

P<0.001
P<0.01

P<0.001
P<0.001

P<0.01
P<0.01

P<0.01
P<0.01

Impact in the Year After Sentencing

I

Reduced Drug Use

•
•

NS'
NS

NS (P<O.OS)d
NS

NS
NS

NS
NS

NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
p<0.001
NS
NS
NS
p<0.001

p<0.05
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
p<0.05
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
p<0.001
NS
NS
NS
p<0.001

NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
p<0.001
NS
p<0.001
p<0.001
p<0.001

NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
p<0.05
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
p<0.001
p<0.001
p<0.001
p<0.001
p<0.001

Any Self-Reported Use
Weekly Self-Reported Use

Reduced Criminal Activity

•

•

•
•

•

Any Arrests
• Any Drug Arrests
• Any Violent Arrests
• Any Property Arrests
• Any Other Arrests
Number of Arrests
• Number of Drug Arrests
• Number of Violent Arrests
• Number of Property Arrests
• Number of Other Arrests
Number of Arrests per Days on the Street
Any Self-Reported Offenses
• Any Self-Reported Drug Offenses
• Any Self-Reported Violent Offenses
• Any Self-Reported Property Offenses
• Any Other Self-Reported Offenses
Number of Self-Reported Offenses
• Number of Self-Reported Drug Offenses
• Number of Self-Reported Violent Offenses
• Number of Self-Reported Property Offenses
• Number of Other Self-Reported Offenses

Other Outcomes

•
•

I

Economic Gains
Reduction in Drug-Related Problems

NS
NS

NS
NS

NS
NS

NS
p<O.os•

a The f ull report can be found on the Urban Institute Web site (www urban.org) under the authors' names This chart is intended to summarize the
significant findings The report presents the full models and coeffi cients for each finding.
b. Based on two tests per week per sa mple group . Defendants who dropped out of testing were counted as having two skipped tests per week .
c. NS: Not Significant.
d Sanctions program participants who also attended NA/AA were significantly less likely to use stronger drugs in the year after sentencing.
e. Treatment program participants were significant ly less likely to have an accident with a veh icle while under the influence of drugs and less likely to have
arguments while under the influence of drugs in the year after sentencing.
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compared to the standard docket sample
(see exhibit 5).

ing than did the standard docket
sample.

Participants in the sanctions program
and participants in the treatment programs were not significantly more
likely to report use of drugs in the year
after sentencing than defendants on
the standard docket. However, the
combination of sanctions and self-help
treatment produced significant reductions in stronger drug use. Analysis of
the interaction between sanctions
program participation and attendance
at NA/AA during the program period
indicates the combination resulted in a
significantly lower likelihood of heroin
and/or cocaine use in the year after
sentencing.

Treatment participants were not significantly less likely than standard docket
defendants to be arrested in the year
after sentencing, nor did they have more
street days before first arrest during the
year. However, they were significantly
less likely to be arrested for a drug offense than those on the standard docket.

Reductions in criminal activity
Sanctions program participants were
significantly less likely than the standard docket sample to be arrested in
the year following sentencing (19 percent compared to 27 percent). Most of
the difference was in the form of a reduced likelihood of an arrest for a drug
offense. Although the sanctions program participants averaged 15 fewer
days on the street in the year after sentencing, this difference in the opportunity to be arrested does not appear to be
of sufficient magnitude to account for
the differences in arrest rates. The estimated per-day probability of arrest
among the pooled group of experimental participants was 0.0006. Adjusting
for the 15 days of extra risk among the
standard docket defendants would
lower their arrest rate to 26 percent but
would not change the significance of
the difference between the groups. The
lower likelihood of arrest was consistent
with the finding that sanctions program
participants had more days on the street
prior to their first arrest after sentenc-

The full targeted sample of the eligible
defendants on the experimental dockets
did not show significant reductions in
criminal activity measured by arrest
records during the year after sentencing.
There were significant reductions in the
number of offenses reported by participants in both the treatment and sanctions programs. 17 Treatment participants
reported significantly fewer offenses in
all crime categories compared to the
standard docket sample. Sanctions program participants reported significantly
fewer offenses overall and significantly
fewer crimes in the "other offense" category. These differences were also significant when all eligible defendants on

i
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these dockets are compared to eligible
defendants on the standard docket.
Analysis of the validity of these estimates against their arrest records and
national estimates of the probability of
arrest, given an offense, tend to call into
question the validity of the self-report
data for the treatment participants, but
not for other sample members. About
40 percent of the offenses repmted by
the treatment participants were associated with an official arrest record,
while 5 percentorfeweroftheoffenses
reported by the standard docket defendants and sanctions participants were
associated with arrests (similar to national evidence comparing arrests to
victimization survey results). This suggests the treatment participants underreported their criminal activity.
The estimated value of reductions in
arrests among sanctions program participants was $1,493,194. These benefits included reductions in the costs
to victims and the reduced costs of
arrest, prosecution, and incarceration.
As a result, the sanctions program
realized a net benefit of $713,570

Exhibit 5. All clean drug tests in the month before sentencing*
Percent
30 ~------------------------------------------------~

25
20
15
10

5

0

I
I
I
I
I

21%

Sanctions
Program
Participants

I
I
I
I

11%

Treatment
Program
Participants

All Eligibles
on Sanctions
Docket

All Eligibles
on Treatment
Docket

All Eligibles
on Standard
Docket

(n=140)

(n=36S)

(n=346)

(n=311)

(n=240)

*

From court records.
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after the additional costs of program
services were deducted, a return of
almost $2 for every $1 spent.

Social and economic impacts
Treatment program participants reported
fewer drug-related social problems in the
year after sentencing compared to the
standard docket sample. These participants were less likely to have an accident with a car or other vehicle or argue
with others while under the influence of
drugs. However, there were no other significant differences in social problems
or economic status in the year after sentencing when participants on the two
experimental dockets were compared
with defendants on the standard docket.

Program costs
The costs of operating the graduated
sanctions and treatment programs were
calculated as the difference in costs
(incremental costs) between the sanctions and standard dockets and the
treatment and standard dockets. Program cost categories included expenditures paid out of project funds, including
salaries, fringe benefits, supplies, contractual services, and drug testing; court
expenditures, including hearings for
program participants; and below-market
expenditures, including the in-kind
costs of detoxification and jail space for
those being sanctioned.
The sanctions program cost of providing
the case management, hearings, warrants, detoxification, jail space for those
being sanctioned, additional drug tests,
and other aspects of the program was
estimated to be $3,248 per pa1ticipant
($10.78 per day in the program). The
treatment program cost of providing the
treatment, hearings, additional drug
tests, and supplementary services was
estimated to be $8,708 per participant
($21.01 per day in the program).
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The biggest cost item was personnel,
accounting for 62 percent of the treatment program costs and 43 percent of
the sanctions program costs. Court services accounted for 25 percent of the
treatment program costs and 32 percent
of the sanctions program costs. Because
the court routinely used twice-weekly
drug tests, the additional drug tests required by the programs amounted to a
modest 9 percent of the treatment program costs and 7 percent of the sanction
program costs. For the sanctions program, other costs such as jail space for
sanctions, warrants, and detoxification
amounted to 16 percent of the total.

Interpreting the findings
The findings indicate positive outcomes
for participants in both of the experimental programs. However, these findings
must be interpreted cautiously because
program participation was voluntary and
may have attracted defendants motivated
to change. Although the analyses controlled for differences in the type and
severity of drug use and prior criminal
history, the threat of selection bias cannot
be ignored.
In generalizing from the findings, it is
important to note that the potential
impact of the graduated sanctions and
treatment programs in other jurisdictions
may be underestimated. The standard
docket in the D.C. Superior Court devoted much more attention to defendant
drug use than many courts. Defendants
who tested positive for drugs at arrest
were tested twice a week during pretrial
release. The judges on this docket frequently referred to drug test results on
their computers and encouraged defendants who continued to use drugs to seek
treatment. Because the D.C. Superior
Court already had these services in
place for both the treatment and control
populations, any crime reduction that
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resulted from these activities would not
have been captured. The finding that the
number of crimes committed by these
drug-involved felony defendants in
the year after sentencing was lower by
several hundred crimes per year than
reported by addicts in other studies
suggests the level of supervision and
services provided exercised a substantial
deterrent effect on all dockets. 18 Similarly, standard docket defendants'
relatively high rates of voluntary participation in community-based drug treatment may have resulted from the judicial
encouragement and reduced their drug
use and criminal activity.
The evaluation is not a robust test of
the potential of treatment given the
problems encountered in implementing the program. Subsequent evaluation of a well-implemented treatment
program is needed before it can be
concluded that treatment in a pretrial
setting has such modest effects on
defendant behavior.
Jurisdictions that do not currently have
a drug testing program or encourage
judicial monitoring of drug use, nonetheless, can expect costs for implementing similar programs to be higher
than those in Washington. The program
cost estimates presented in this document account for the additional expenditures for the sanctions and treatment
services (including additional drug
tests) but do not include the costs of the
basic testing and the very sophisticated
computer system in place to support the
comt. For similar reasons, jurisdictions
without computerized records of test results and active judicial involvement
might expect to see additional significant impacts of program operation.
The impacts reported must also be
considered in light of the characteristics of the eligible population targeted

•••
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for intervention, which consisted of all
defendants charged with drug felonies.
Unlike many drug courts that exclude
defendants convicted of a violent
offense or facing pending charges for
a violent offense (required for Federal
drug court funding), the programs were
open to those individuals with long
criminal histories as well as first offenders. Unlike many drug courts, the
program was not limited to addicts
because eligibility for the program was
based on drug test results, not individualized assessments of addiction.
As a result, the program participants
varied widely in the severity and duration of their drug use.

Lessons for court-based drug
intervention programs
One important lesson from the sanctions program was the effectiveness of
combining treatment and sanctions.
Both the treatment and graduated sanctions programs reduced drug use during
the period of supervision. However, the
results indicate more lasting effects can
he achieved by combining graduated
sanctions with voluntary participation
in NA/AA, as evidenced by the lower
likelihood of heroin and cocaine use
in the year after sentencing among the
defendants receiving both.
The results also point to the importance
of getting the defendants' up-front
commitment to the rules. In the focus
group, sanction program participants
said they agreed in advance to the sanctions and the rules for applying penalties
because it gave them a feeling of control
and a sense they were treated fairly.
These defendants knew they could avoid
penalties by not using drugs, and it was
their responsibility to show the judge
they were clean through drug test results. This "contingency contract" hetween the judge and defendant clearly
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differentiates these sanctions from imposed penalties using poorly understood
or inconsistently enforced rules.
The twice-weekly drug tests were a
relatively inexpensive strategy for
screening defendants for drug use in a
timely manner. The majority of those
failing two drug tests did so within a
month to 6 weeks of arrest. Using tests
as a screening process enabled the
intervention programs to devote their
staff resources to conducting individualized assessments (in the treatment
program) or seeking community-based
treatment programs (in the sanctions
program) for those defendants known
to use drugs. By focusing assessments
on the subset of known users, the court
identified a diverse and relatively
large group of drug-involved offenders.
Strong and cohesive leadership was important to the success of the programs.
The judges' commitment to program
implementation was one of the strengths
of the experimental demonstration.
Judges are reassigned annually in
Washington, and the drug felony dockets
were treated as one of the regular assignments. A total of nine judges-three per
docket-presided during the demonstration period. Despite the expected
diversity in style (some were viewed by
defendants as stricter than others, some
as friendlier than others), all performed
effectively in these assignments, closely
followed the program procedures, actively participated in monthly meetings
to discuss procedures and issues, and
collahoratively worked to solve problems
and modify procedures as needed across
the entire period of the demonstration.
The judges met monthly with representatives of the U.S. Attorney's Office, public
defenders, and the pretrial and probation
agencies. This group has continued to
meet and guide drug court interventions
for the D.C. Superior Court.
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